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Abstract
Firm-level decision models and farm survey data are examined to identify
the major factors which influence participation and redemption decisions and
to rationalize the different patterns,of response among farms. The major
factors identified as important to the farmer's decisions are alternative
marketing or feeding opportunities, storage costs, risk-bearing ability,
cash flow requirements, price expectations and reserve program provisions.
The survey results show the differing responses of farmers to be related to
many of these factors. Larger, specialized cash-grain farms were more likely
to participate than smaller, diversified farms. Among participants the
largest cash-grain farms were most likely to continue holding reserve grain
after the release.
Keywords: Farmer-owned reserve, Participation decisi^ons, Distribution of
benefits, Farm survey.
Farmers' Response to the Reserve:
An Analysis of Economic and Structural Factors
William H. Meyers, Robert W. Jolly and Mary E. Ryan*
The success of the farmer-owned grain reserve in achieving its objec
tives depends in part upon the response of individual decision makers —
the farmers — to a set of program instruments controlled by the government.
These instruments are designed to induce farmers to place grain in the
reserve when prices are low and to redeem and sell it when prices are high.
How farmers actually respond to those incentives determines how rapidly the
reserve is filled (or how large it becomes) in periods of surplus, how
quickly it is depleted in periods of shortage and ultimately how much it
costs to achieve reserve objectives. Moreover, the distribution of program
benefits by farm size and type is influenced by how different farmers respond
to program instruments.
Those concerned with managing, modifying or studying the farmer-
owned reserve program need an understanding of the major economic and struc
tural factors that influence farmers' response to changes in reserve program
instruments. A study of farm level behavior can help to identify how various
program instruments affect grain placement and redemption decisions and why
response patterns differ among farmers.
* Meyers and Jolly are assistant professors of economics, Iowa State
University, and Ryan is associate professor of agricultural and applied
economics, University of Minnesota.
This research is a contribution from the Iowa and Minnesota Agriciiltural
Experiment Stations as collaborators under North Central Region cooperative
research project number NC-152. Helpful comments were provided by W.
Boutwell, H. Burnstein, p. Calkins, W. Cochrane, and M. Martin.
In this paper, we rely both upon economic theory and farm survey data^^
to examine farmers' response to the reserve program. First, we look at the
reserve from a firm-level perspective and draw inferences from economic
analyses of farm behavior. Then, we analyze survey data with respect to
factors that influence farmers' responses to reserve placement and redemption
opportunities. Finally, we discuss the implications of these results for
reserve management policy.
Analysis of Economic Factors
Farmers' behavior in the reserve can be related to two distinct manage
ment problems or decisions. First, farmers must decide whether or not to
participate in the reserve and the quantity of grain to be committed. Second,
once the release price has been attained, farmers who have participated in
the program must decide on a marketing strategy for their reserve grain.
We will look at these two aspects separately.
— The survey of corn and wheat farmers in nine states was conducted in
the summer of 1979. Data also were obtained from local ASCS offices on
grain reserve placements and redemptions by all participating farmers in the
survey. The survey included
Corn (sample size)
East: Illinois (630)
Indiana (536)
Michigan (266)
Ohio (418)
West: Iowa (875)
Minnesota (320)
Nebraska (225)
Wheat (sample size)
Hard Spring: Minnesota (703)
North Dakota (715)
Hard Winter: Kansas (1873)
Nebraska (572)
Soft Winter: Illinois (431)
Indiana (582)
Michigan (353)
Ohio (573)
Participants and nonparticipants in the grain reserve program were surveyed,
except in the four soft winter wheat states where there was no grain reserve
group because of low participation rates. More detail on survey procedures
and state-by-state results are reported by Ryan and Meyers.
The Participation Decision
Grain storage, whether encouraged by a government program or not is a
form of investment. By deciding to store grain, the farmer foregoes cur
rent marketing alternatives in hopes of receiving a higher price in the
future. In the process, storage costs are incurred. The farmer will decide
to store grain if two conditions are met: 1) the expected increase in revenue
exceeds the costs of storage and 2) the farm business iis able to withstand
/
the reduced cash flow and increased risk stemming from the storage decision.
As with any investment, profitability, cash flow and risk must be considered
together. All farmers will not make the same storage decision even with
access to the same information, because storage costs, expectations about
future price movements, risk-bearing ability and cash flow requirements will
vary widely among individual producers.
The reserve program does not alter the importance of these factors, but
it changes, the decision environment in several ways. It imposes some
additional constraints on when grain sales can be made. Storage costs are
2/
reduced by the storage payment and the waiver of interest on the loan,— As
with all nonrecourse loans, cash flow constraints due to storage are reduced
by the loan, and downside risk is limited by the default option,
A farmer with grain to sell has a nuniber of options, For example, corn
may be sold immediately, fed to livestock, stored on the farm or in the
elevator, forward contracted, hedged, used as collateral for a 9-month non*-
recourse loan or placed in the reserve. How might a farmer compare storing
grain in the reserve with the other marketing options available? To gain some
insight into this decision, consider how a corn farmer, making use of good
2/
— Since March 19.78, interest has been waived after one year on all
reserve contracts.
management prac1:ices, might compare participating in the reserve program
with a current.cash sale.
If a farmer signs a reserve contract, corn cannot be sold until market
prices reach the release level (currently 125 percent of the loan rate).
In return, the farmer receives a loan equal to 80% of the release price.
Interest may be charged on the loan, but the rate is below commercial rates
and the period over which interest is charged is one year or less. In
addition, the participant receives an advance storage payment at the beginning
of each year. Storage payments are stopped when prices exceed the release
level for a specified length of time, and the loan must be paid off when prices
3/exceed the call level (currently 145 percent of the loan rate),— This array
Iof program stipulations affects the returns and the risk from reserve partici
pation. To compare the reserve contract with a current grain price, we need
to calculate the present value of the flow of costs and returns associated
with the contract.
The present value (PV) of the reserve contract is determined by three
major components — the loan rate, the net storage payment and the net final
sale value of the grain. The loan rate is received immediately, but the
other costs and returns incurred during the contract period must be dis
counted and expressed in current dollars. These three components are related
in the following expression:
PV = Loan rate + Discounted net storage payment + Discounted net
final value
The last two terms in the expression require further explanation.
3/ *— See Burnstein for a detailed description of these provisions.
If the annual storage payment exceeds costs, the discounted value will
be positive. If costs exceed the payment, the term is negative. The pay
ment is approximately equal to commercial storage costs in major grain-
producing states, but on-farm storage costs may vary widely from commer
cial rates. Direct costs,> such as the extra drying and resulting shrinkage
under long-term storage, will probably be higher on the farm, but other
components of costs will often be lower. If a farmer owns, grain bins, owner
ship costs — depreciation, interest, repairs, taxes and insurance on
facilities — should be ignored in the marginal cost calculation. Howr-
ever, the farmer may want to include an opportunity cost on the bins,
reflecting a rental rate or an average return earned from alternative
storage strategies. Therefore, storage costs incurred by individual farmers
will differ substantially, and could be higher or lower than the payment
rate.
The net final value is determined when the reserve contract is ter
minated, The loan repayment along with any accrued interest must be deducted
from the sales price. Quality discounts, shrinkage and handling charges
must also be taken into account. Any unearned portion of that year*s storage
payment must be refunded as well.
In Table 1, we have calculated present values for corn in the reserve
for a range of redemption prices and storage intervals (see appendix table
Table 1 — Calculated present values for corn in the reserve under
alternative assumptions
Years in
storage
- Sale price at redemption ($/bu)
Case 2,25^^ 2.50^^ 2.81 2,95 3.10 3.26
1 - - 2.44 2.56 2.69 2,83
1 2 - - 2,42 2.53 2.64 2.76
3 2.02 2.19 2,40 2.49 2.60 2,70
1 - - 2.59 2.71 2.84 2.98
2 2 - - 2,70 2,81 2.92 3.04
3 2.42
A
2.40
2.59 2.80 2.89 3.00 3.10
1 - - 2.84 2.95 3.09 3,22
3 2 - - 2,94 3,04 3.16 , 3.27
3 2.75 2.82 3,03 3.12 3.22 3.32
Assumptions:
Case 1
Loan rate
Interest on loan
Discount rate
Storage loss
Storage cost
$2.25
11.5 percent for first year
13 percent per year
3 percent per year
Storage payment = 26,5 cents/bushel/year
Case 2
Storage cost =11,5 cents/bushel/year
Other variables as in Case 1
Case 3
'^Loan rate = $2,40
Interest waived
Storage cost = 11.5 cents/bushel/year
Other variables as in Case 1
a/ •The empty cells reflect the fact that corn cannot be redeemed at prices
below, the release level until the contract expires.
for similar calculations for wheat,)—^ We have used 1980/81 program pro
visions in making these estimates and have assumed that the grain is sold at
the time of redemption, A storage loss of 3 percent is assumed, although
actual losses will vary substantially depending on management of stored
grain. The discount rate is assumed to be 13 percent, a figure midway
between interest on operating loans and returns to common financial instru
ments. In Case 1, storage costs are assumed to equal the government storage
pajnnent. This might occur if grain were stored commercially. If reserve
corn were stored for 2 years and sold for $2,95 per bushel, the PV of the
outcome would be $2,53, This is substantially more than the return to pri
vate storage,—^
Suppose that, at the time participation is being considered, the farmer
could sell corn for $2,60 per bushel. If the farmer knew reserve corn would
be sold in 2 years for $2.95, he would choose not to participate. The PV of
4/— The equation used in computing PV in Table 1 is
t S - C (1 - s)PA - (1 + in)PL - R. - L
PV = PL + 2 + ;
j«l (1 + r)^"-^ (1 + r)^
where
C = cost of storage, grain rotation, aeration, fumigation, etc,
i = interest rate charged on loan per period
L = loading costs
n = number of periods interest is charged (n ^ t)
PL = loan rate
P* = sales price at redemption
r = discount rate-
- R = refund of storage subsidy
s = percent loss due to shrinkage and quality deterioration
S = storage payment
t « period in which grain is redeemed and sold
—^If com were stored without the program benefits for 2 years with
annual storage costs of 26^5 cents and then sold for $2,95, the present value
would be $1,75,
8the contract ($2.53) is less than the current price of $2.60. But this out
come obviously is not guaranteed. Both the redemption price and storage
interval are unknown when the contract is signed. Compared with a current
cash sale, participation in the reserve is risky. Clearly, expectations of
future events in grain markets will affect the perceived returns from the
reserve. So too will the expected response of government to these events
through changes in program instruments. The farmer's ability to bear the
risk of the decision will also influence the degree of participation.
Case 2 represents a situation in which storage costs are substantially
less than the storage payment. This would often be the case for grain stored
on the farm. PV now increases with the storage interval; the longer one stores,
the better. In this situation nearly all the outcomes are at least as profit
able as a current sale at $2,60 per bushel.
Case 3 demonstrates how changes in program instruments may-alter the
decision environment of farmers. The changes in PV from case 2 to case, 3
reflect the interest waiver and higher reserve loan levels legislated by the
Congress in November 1980, The dramatic impact on the profitability of a
reserve contract derives primarily from the interest waiver. Under these
program provisions, it would be attractive for many farmers to enter the
reserve at prices well above the release level, which is permitted if the
reserve is not in call status.
Two further program instruments — the release and call levels do not
appear explicitly in the budgeting procedure that we have used in calculating
PV, Their role in the decision process is rather complex. From a farmer's
point of view, the release and call levels will influence expectations about
returns and risk from participation. The expected time path of prices is the
key factor in making the participation decision because both the redemption
price and the length of storage influence PV, The date of sale can be as
important as the price received, '
Grain in the reserve cannot be sold until prices reach the release
level or until the contract expires. How might an increase in the release
level alter a farmer's interpretation of Table 1? One factor would be
the farmer's perception of the market impact of the reserve, If the farmer
believes that a higher release level will increase total participation in
the reserve and significantly tighten market supplies, then a higher price or
shorter storage time for reserve grain may be expected. This will make a
reserve contract more attractive. If the farmer does not expect the change
to affect market behavior, then increasing the release level might simply
increase the expected storage time and make the contract less attractive.
Another way the release level can influence expectations relates to the
government's response to, market conditions. If at the end of 3 years, prices
still are less than the release level, the government may choose to extend
reserve contracts or permit conversion to new contracts. If farmers expect
government to behave in this way, then they may view the release level as a
de facto support price for participants, and sale prices below the release
would be considered irrevelant^
The effect on participation of changes in the call level also is somewhat
ambiguous. The farmer is required to repay the loan but not to actually sell
the grain when it is "called," Whether or not a farmer will interpret the
call level as a ceiling price depends in part on individual cash flow require
ments and reserve inventories. When the' reserve is called, some farmers
~ Farmers are likely to take this view now that several releases have
occurred and contract conversions, have been permitted.
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will need to sell all or part of their reserve grain to repay the loan and
other costs. For them, the call level is tantamount to a ceiling price.
For fanners with lower cash requirements, the call level defines the point
at which total costs of grain storage are reassumed by the firm. For these
fanners, the call level approximates a ceiling price only if they expect the
operation of the reserve program effectively to contain price movements above
that level. This expectation will be greatly influenced by past experience
with aggregate market behavior.
Our analysis has shown that with identical expectations of the future,
farmers could make different participation decisions because of differences
in storage costs, risk bearing ability and cash flow requirements.—^ It is
also clear from the decision model presented that there are other differ
ences among farms that can influence participation. Among the more important
are the alternative grain marketing opportunities, the existence and size of
livestock enterprises, local market conditions and participation in other
government programs.
Expectations of the future also will vary among farmers. They will
differ in their interpretation of market information, and some will have access
to information not available to others. These factors are important,
particularly as they relate to the price sensitivity of reserve participa
tion. Some of these effects are quite evident in the survey results to be
presented.
— The cash flow for participants is the sum of the loan and one year's
storage payment ($2,515 in Cases 1 and 2, $2,665 in Case 3). For nonpartici-
pants the cash flow is the current market price.
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The Redemption Decision
Once the release level has been achieved, the reserve participant must
formulate a marketing plan. The farmer could sell immediately or continue
storing the crop. The release decision is a grain storage problem with the
same investment dimensions discussed earlier. The farmer will continue to
store grain after release if the expected price increase exceeds storage
costs, provided that the cash flow and risk situation is satisfactory.
One approach to making this decision is to compute the marginal carrying
cost for reserve grain and compare it with-the expected price change. We
illustrate this approach for farm-stored com, then consider the implications
of storing commercially.
Suppose that storage payments have been suspended and that the farmer
could, sell the reserve corn at $3.00. At the time of the decision, the far
mer already has invested the original loan and this year's storage subsidy.
If the contract is more than a year old or has a total interest waiver,
the marginal interest cost on the loan is zero. Were the grain sold at
$3.00, the loan, accrued interest and any unearned storage would have to be
repaid. These items make up the contract closing costs. Selling now would
add some capital to the business — the difference between the sale price
and the contract closing costs. Interest charged on this residual an
opportunity cost — is the major component in the marginal carrying cost
8/
for grain stored on farm.— In other words, if the farmer continued storing
— Some allowance could be made for additional shrink or deteriora
tion losses, these are minor factors and are omitted to simplify the
discussion.
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reserve corn, only the residual is foregone^ and the cost of storage is
equal to an interest charge on this value. In most cases, this cost is
rather small.
As an example, we have calculated closing costs for two common
reserve contracts for com (Table 2). In computing the unearned storage
refund, we assumed a January contract date in both cases. Storage payments
for both contracts ceased August 31, 1980. Closing costs after this date
remained constant. In the 1978 crop contract, the loan was $2.00 and
interest was charged at 7 percent for 12 months. For 1979 crop corn
signed after the embargo, the loan was $2,1(^ and interest was waived.
In Table 3, 3 ^nd S-montK carrj^tog costs are presented for corn stored
under the 1978 and post—embargo 1979. contracts for a range of redemption
9/ „prices. Even without storage payments, the storage costs are very low,
A farmer with a current sales opportunity of $3,00 per bushel needs only an
8-cent price increase to cover costs for an 8-anonth storage Interval, The
size of the loan and the limitation on loan interest to 1 year or less are
the major program instruments that keep these costs so low.
The use of commercial storage increases these carrying charges sub
stantially, As an example, the current marginal commercial storage rate
for corn in Iowa is about 2 cents/bushel/month. Adding this to the figur
in Table 3 would approximately triple the carrying charges.
es
9/ Marginal carrying costs (MC) were estimated by using the equation;
MC - (P* - a + ±n)PL - R). X r* + CR
where
CR = marginal commercial storage rate CCR « 0 if stored on farm)
r* » effective interest rate or cost of capital
PL> R defined in footnote 4.
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Table 2 — Closing costs on two common corn
reserve contracts.
1) 1978 Crop (Reserve I)
Loan rate $2,00
Interest .14
Unearned storage^^ .09
$2.23
2) 1979 Crop (Reserve II)
Loan rate $2.10
Interest (waived)
Unearned storage^' .09
$2.19
a/
— For a contract signed in January,
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I
Program provisions also influence carrying costs. A wider band between
the loan rate and release level Increases the difference between sale price
and closing costs and thereby raises the carrying charge. Thus, carrying
charges for wheat would tend to be higher than those for feed grains.'. The
new reserve loan rates passed by the Congress (Noveniber 1980) do not affect
release levels, so that change,will reduce carrying charges.
As noted in the preceding section, the farmer must assume full costs
of grain storage (within 90 days) after the reserve enters call status. If
the grain is not sold, this entails paying an interest charge — an opportunity
cost — on the current sale value of the grain. With a capital cost of
15 percent per annum, the carrying costs approximately quadruple in magnitude.
Thus the call for repayment has about the same effect as imposing the market
rate of interest on the reserve loan. >
This is the profitability dimension of the decision. Cash flow, risk-
bearing ability and bin space constraints also may enter. Redeeming the
reserve grain for $3.00 will increase cash flow immediately. If cash flow
requirements are high or if operating capital is in short supply, the potential
profit from storage may have to be foregone. As with participation,
differences in farm characteristics, location and expectations also will
contribute to a diversity of response to redemption opportunities. The
survey data presented in the next section provide some evidence of these
effects.
Analysis of Farm Survey
In the previous section, we have seen that the same program provisions
will elicit different responses among farmers. The analysis of the farm
survey data focuses on factors that may help to explain the differing
16
participation decisions and the differing levels of redemption activity
among farmers. In some instances, the patterns of response seen in the
survey results can be interpreted in the context of the economic decision
criteria discussed in the previous sections.
Participation Response
At the time the survey was conducted (summer 1979) the wheat reserve
had been in operation for 2 years and the corn reserve for about 1 1/2
years. All farmers had been eligible to place 1976 and 1977 crop wheat and
com in the reserve, and set-aside participants were eligible to place 1978
crop wheat and corn. Some 1978 crop corn was placed early in the year when
10/
direct entry— was permitted, but 1978 wheat did not enter the reserve
until after the survey period. Both the wheat and corn reserves had reached
target levels and were effectively closed to new placements for 3 to 4 months
preceding the survey.
Because the aggregate data revealed distinct regional differences in
response, we analyzed the survey data by regions. The four eastern Corn Belt
states in the survey account for about 37 percent of U.S. com production,"
but in February 1979, held only 13 percent of grain reserve stocks of corn.
In contrast, the three western states surveyed produced about the same
share of the nation's corn but held 73 percent of its reserve. Differences
also exist among wheat states. About one-fifth of U.S. wheat is grown in
each of the two hard-wheat state groups, and 10 percent comes from the four
soft red winter wheat states surveyed. Shares in the national wheat reserve
were about 33, 25 and 0.6 percent, respectively.
—^ One provision of the reserve program was that grain could enter only
after the maturity of a 9-^m3nth loan contract. Occasionally an exception was
made and "direct entry" was permitted to accelerate placements. After Octo
ber 1979, direct entry has been allowed except when the reserve is in call
status.
Among the farmers contacted, participation rates in the reserve program
ranged from negligible for soft winter wheat (not reported) to 26 percent
for spring wheat (Table 4). Farmers who placed grain in the reserve had
large, cash-grain operations, with 40 to 74 percent more cropland and 77 to
112 percent more wheat or corn acreage, on average, than nonparticipants.
Wheat or corn was the major 1978 crop of all groups in all states except in
Minnesota and Nebraska, There, nonparticipating wheat farmers had more feed
grain than wheat acreage. Although the soft winter-wheat survey had too few
participants for comparisons to be made, structural characteristics of the
nonparticipants were very similar to those of the nonparticipating corn
farmers in the same eastern Corn Belt states.
Close to the same shares of participants and nonparticipants had live
stock, but, for nonparticipating corn farmers, livestock (including dairy)
was a more important source of 1978 income than were grains. This was more
evident in the western Corn Belt than in the east, Nonparticipants in both
corn regions also committed more of their 1978 crop to livestock feeding.
Grain reserve participants tended to be younger, with higher debt/asset
ratios than nonparticipants. Full owners were less likely to be in the pro
gram than part-owners. Participation in other government programs was
significantly less for corn nonparticipants, but more than three-fourths of
nonparticipating wheat growers took part in the 1978 set-aside program.
Thus, unwillingness to participate in any government program is not character
istic of nonparticipating wheat growers or of a substantial share of non-
participants in the western Corn Belt,
18
Table 4 — Characteristics of farms, storage facilities and storage levels for
participants (P) and nonparticipants (NP) by region
Corn Hard Wheat
East West Winter
Mean Levels P NP P NP P NP P NP
(Percent of farms contacted) (2) (98) (19) (81) (26) (74) (.10) (90)
a/
Number of farmers interviewed— 37 743 227 333 294 480 224 525
Cropland acres 546 314 509 300 931 667 850 598
Corn or wheat acres 324 153 259 136 364 206 298 158
Major enterprise 1978 —^
Grains (%) 32 30 33 21 44 49 49 52 .
Livestock (%) 19 35 32 50 21 2i 29 29
Percent of 78 crop fed (%) 16 28 19 44 - - - -
Debt/asset ratio (%) 23 .12 23 16 25 20 24 19
Age 50 54 48 51 49 52 50 53
Tenancy
Full owner (%) 26 41 36 50 33 44 16 26
Own part-rent part (%) 65 45 53 38 61 45 74 57
1978 Set-aside participant (%) 69 28 81 48 89 76 96 79
Storage
Capacity/crop acre (bu.) 68 62 88 52 50 30 56 31
Added some 1977-78 (%) 63 24 59 24 70 34 41 22
Have drying equipment (%) 80 59 80 47 33 19 32 25
Total stored (1000 bu.) 9.5 2.8 17.1 3.3 11.5 1.9 11.5 0.4
Percent of 78 production 26 17 57 23 93 30 117 9
r/
Free quantity stored (1000 bu.)— 4.5 2.8 6.5 3.3 4.8 1.9 7.5 0.4
Percent of 78 production 12 17 22 23 39 30 76 9
a/
— All participants were interviewed but only a subsample of nonparticipants,
—^ Percent of farms for which grains/livestock is the major enterprise.
c/
— Corn or wheat stored that is not under resea?ve contract.
19
Grain storage was a major enterprise of participants. Except in the
eastern Corn Belt, participants had a much larger storage capacity per crop
land acre than nonparticipants. Part of this difference was the result of
facilities added in 1977 or 1978 by about 60% of corn participants, 70% of
hard spring-wheat and 41% of hard winter-wheat participants. The respective
percentages for nonparticipants were about half as large. Participants,
especially corn producers, were better equipped for grain drying.
In.all areas the quantity of grain stored by participants far exceeded
that of nonparticipants. This is explained in'part by the larger average
acreage and production of participants, but even as a percentage of 1978
production, participants carried two to three times as much grain in storage
than did nonparticipants.
The data indicate that, except in the eastern Corn Belt, participants
carried at least the same level of free stocks as nonparticipants, relative
to production. The extent to which new facilities were added and the evidence
that free-stock holding by participants is not much different from that of
nonparticipants suggest that reserve participants may not view reserve
grain as a substitute for normal inventory activities. This is an important
question and needs further investigation. To the extent that participating
farmers maintain their normal free-stock levels, the effectiveness of the
reserve program in increasing total stocks is enhanced.
Respondents were asked to rank the importance of various factors in
making the participation decision. Compared with nonparticipants, partici
pants placed much greater Importance on current and expected future cash
20
prices, somewhat greater importance on expected higher release prices and
much less importance on storage constraints and set-aside requirements
(Table 5). Nonparticipants frequently chose the middle ground ("important"),
and many expressed no opinion.
The preceding data comparisons paint an image of participants as large,
well equipped, aggressive farm operators, rather specialized in crop pro
duction and using the reserve and other government programs for risk manage
ment and income support. These findings are consistent with the economic
decision model with respect to participation. In terms of profitability
factors, the nonparticipants were less well equipped to handle storage
themselves and would be more dependent on higher cost commercial storage.
Differing structural characteristics frequently reflect differences in risk
bearing ability. For corn, smaller farms with a more important livestock
'enterprise may be less exposed to >risk in the crop operations or may have
higher valued alternative uses for grain. The size of the livestock
operation relative to grain production also may constrain the quantity
available for long-term storage. In the hard spring wheat and soft winter
wheat areas, wheat acreage of nonparticipants was less than feed grain
acreage, implying less risk exposure compared with those with greater
reliance on wheat production.
The examination of survey data sheds little light on reasons for much
higher participation rates in the western Corn Belt and hard spring wheat
regions than in the other two. Participants* characteristics and opinions are
remarkably uniform across states, and, similarly, no general interstate dif^-
ferences emerged for nonparticipants. This pattern suggests that there are
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Table 5 — Importance of factors in deciding whether or not to participate in the
reserve program
Corn
East West
Hard Wheat
Spring
> NP
Winter
NPNP NP
Expect higher future prices
Little importance 4 15 2 12 2 8 ^2 8
Important 24 44 27 51 . 26 41 14 45
Extreme importance 72 41 71 37 72 51 84 47
Current market price
Little importance 10 18 8 20 5 14 , 5 8
Important 17 52 26 59 30 51 24^ 55
Extreme importance • 73 30 66 21 65 35 71 37
Expected higher release price
Little importance 42 42 36 34 29 24 24 29
Important 27 42 40 48 47 49 34 46
Extreme importance 31 16 24 18 24 27 42 25
Availability of storage \
Little importance 48 27 . 32 22 26 19 49 29
Important 27 48 39 50 50 58 32 51
Extreme importance 15 25 29 28 24 23 19 20
Possible grain spoilage
Little importance 60 31 44 27 35 24 58 28
Important 20 39 29 41 36 41 20 42
Extreme importance 20 30 27 32 29 35 22 30
Set-aside requirement
Little importance 43 22 42 33 35 20 40 27
Important 30 51 44 43 41 49 34 51
Extreme importance 27 27 • 14 24 24 31 26" 22
a/— Responses were "little importance," "important," "extreme importance" or
"no opinion." Those with no opinion were excluded from the percentages reported
here.
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more of the farm- and fanner-types who are likely to participate in the western
than the eastern Corn Belt and in the spring than the winter hard wheat
states. Market conditions are also an important factor in regional differ
ences. The wider basis prevalent in the western Corn Belt is accentuated in
periods of price weakness and would contribute to greater participation.
Also, the unusually strong prices for soft wheat during 1978/79 certainly
were a deterent to participation among eastern Corn Belt wheat growers
(Burnstein, 2).
Redemption Response of Participants
Wheat in the reserve was released in May 1979, and storage payments
were suspended on June 30. Corn was released from June 19 to August 1,
\
1979, so storage payments were not suspended. Aggregate data show that 38
percent of wheat reserves and 25 percent of corn reserves were released by
the end of September. Fortuitously, it was during this release period that
the survey data on redemption behavior were collected.
The percentage of corn farmers who had redeemed some grain at the time
of the survey ranged from 83 in Indiana to lA in Minnesota (Table 6). The
percentage of reserve grain that was redeemed also varied greatly from 71
in Illinois to 12 in Minnesota. In the western Corn Belt and spring wheat
states, fewer farmers relied wholly or partly on commercial storage, so
lower carrying costs would partly explain the lower redemption rates.. Most
farmers gave either price or cash flow requirements as the main reason for
redemption of grain. The need for cash was notable in Illinois and the hard
winter-wheat states, where redemption rates were high.
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Table 6 —Redemption response and influencing factors by state
Redeemed
some
(No.) %
Percent of
total
placements
%
Use Commercial
storage
%
Main reason
for redemption
Price
%
Need
cash
Corn East^/
Indiana (10) 83 56 42 57 22
Illinois (9) 75 71 42 25 67
Corn West
Iowa (43) 40 25 15 49 13
Nebraska (14) 33 20 26 46 27
Minnesota (7) 14 12 6 27 27
Hard winter wheat
Kansas (117) 74 60 73 13 70
Nebraska ' (33) 58 41 44 • 21 68
Hard spring wheat
North Dakota (53) 41 22 8 39 16
Minnesota (42) 34 18 6 31 40
a/Data are not reported for Michigan and Ohio because there were so few
observations.
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All grain reserve participants were asked to rank the importance of
five nonprice factors in their decisions to sell or hold grain that is in
release status. The removal of storage pajrments was the major factor in the
western Corn Belt and hard winter wheat areas while storage space was con
sidered most important in the other two regions (Table 7). When farmers
volunteered "other" factors important to the decision, price was by far the
dominant choice, except in the eastern Corn Belt. There, cash need was
mentioned more than price.
To further examine farmers' response to redemption incentives, we
classified participants as sellers, partial sellers and holders according to
their answers to the question; "Have you removed all, some of, "none of your
corn/wheat from the grain reserve since it opened?" After classification the
three groups were compared to determine what characteristics and opinions
differentiated them (Table 8).
Somewhat surprisingly, sellers and holders in Iowa (corn) and hard
spring-wheat states had similar characteristics while partial sellers
differed. In these states partial sellers had larger farms and planted more
corn or spring wheat in 1978 than did sellers or holders. Partial sellers'
1978 farm sales reflected greater dependence on cash grain. Sellers and
holders depended more on livestock earnings. The partial sellers in Iowa
and the hard spring wheat states were large, cash-grain farmers. Their
redemption behavior suggested use of the grain reserve as a tool in their
marketing strategies.
In Iowa, holders owned the greatest share of the cropland farmed and
had the lowest debt/asset ratio. Having a larger equity, they were perhaps
better able to hold their corn for later use. They also had more "free"
25
Table 7—Ranking of factors that influenc^ the decision to sell or hold
grain that is in release status-
Hard WheatCorn
Factor East West
Spring Winter'
Storage payments stopping 2 (-9) 1 (26) 2 (9) 1 (16)
Storage space 1 (2) 2 (16) il (23) 2 (-5)
Time of year 3 (-10) 3 (-7) 4 (-6)
4 (-15)
Tax situation 5 (-39) 4 (-19) 3 (-5) 3 (-10)
Size of CCC stocks 4 (-38) 5 (-23) 5 (-16) 5 (-31)
Other factors volunteered by
respondents
Price 39 64 65
65
Transportation 8 10 14 2
Cash needs 41 5 3
14
a/
XUtt ptSi. liciiuagco J-ii poj.
answering *very important' and the percentage
45% of corn participants considered stopping of storage payments very important
in their decisions while 24% answered 'not important'.
•^The ercenta es in arentheses are the differences between the percentage
I e 'verv .i Dort answering 'not important , Q*g«
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corn stored, allowing market options without redeeming grain-reserve corn.
In all three crop groups,sellers had the least corn or wheat acreage
and they were the least dependent on cash grain for income. Sellers in both
wheat groups had the highest debt/asset ratios. In the hard winter wheat
group, there was little difference among characteristics of sellers,
partial sellers, and holders in other respects. The higher redemption rate
in this region may have obscured, differences that occurred early in the
release period.
In terms of the conceptual model presented earlier, differing rates of
redemption can be rationalized by differing storage costs, liquidity con
straints on cash or grain, expectations and risk factors. The survey has
demonstrated the role of costs and liquidity in the redemption response.
As wit^ participation, there is evidence that those more exposed
to grain market risk because of a large cash grain enterprise are using the "
reserve as a risk management tool. Expectations are not well reflected in
the survey data,but current, local market conditions clearly were influencing
decisions.
Policy Implications
The survey data provide a view of how farmers responded up to the summer
of 1979, The differences in farm characteristics between participants and
nonparticipants arise primarily from economic factors, which make the reserve
program more attractive to some than to others. Insights into the types of
farms and farmers who found the reserve most attractive are useful in
evaluating the distribution of benefits from the reserve program.
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To the extent that market prices are increased (decreased) by the
reserve operation all farmers gain (lose), but reserve participants benefit
further by their ability to carry grain from surplus to deficit periods at
little (or even negative) cost. Judging from the survey results, the
distribution of these benefits favors the larger cash grain farmers who are
the major program participants. In this respect the reserve resembles other
government programs that provide benefits proportional to size or produc
tion. It may be more efficient for the reserve grain to be carried by
100,000 large fame than by 300,000 small farms, but problems of equity
arise if the benefits of participation far exceed the costs incurred.
Policymakers need to be cognizant of this in determining program provisions.
If the reserve program is to be used primarily as a price and supply
stabilization mechanism, it is desirable that program provisions be designed
so as to assure adequate placements during surplus periods and an adequate
rate of redemptions during shortage periods. If provisions are too
attractive they could result in windfall gains to participants, an excessive
demand for reserve contracts in surplus periods, and a slow rate of redemp
tion response during shortage periods. As an example, the interest waiver
passed by Congress in 1980 made placements an attractive option to farm
ers with on-farm storage even at prices well above the release level
(see Case 3, Table 1). This could hardly be justified in terms of stabiliza
tion objectives.
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Our analysis of the redemption decision indicates that the waiver of
second and third year interest- on reserve loans contributes substantially
to the low carrying charge on grain in release status. Thus, the interest
waiver tends to slow the rate of redemption and increase the amount of
reserve grain carried into call status. Whether or not this creates problems
can be better determined after more experience with the behavior of farmers
and markets when the reserve is in call status. A more even flow of grain
from the reserve between the release and call triggers may be desirable.
The importance of the interest waiver in reducing carrying costs suggests
that the imposition of a market rate of interest on reserve loans would be
nearly as effective as the "call" mechanism in terms of moving reserve grain
into the market after prices exceed the call level. The interest charge
essentially would place farmers back into a private inventory decision
framework, and the government would not be required to impose any payoff
dates other than that specified by the reserve contract.
In a time of concern about budget constraints and the effect of govern
ment programs on farm structure, the cost of the reserve program and the
distribution of its benefits are vital issues, A cost-effective approach to
reserve management would make reserve program provisions sufficiently
attractive to assure adequate rates of placement and redemption but not so
attractive as to provide excessive benefits to participants. This approach
would require that the Secretary of Agriculture retain discretionary authority
over the interest charge as well as other program provisions. Although fre
quent changes in the provisions add complexity and uncertainty to the program,
excessive rigidity could threaten the viability of the reserve. The program
administrators need the flexibility to maintain a proper balance between these
extremes»
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Appendix Table — Calculated present values for wheat in the reserve under
alternative assumptions
Case
Years in
storage 3.00^^
Sale price at redemption
3.60^^ , 4,20 4.55
($/bu)
4.90 5.25
1 • - - 3.65 3.95 4.25 4.55
1 2 - - 3.57 3.84 4.10 4.37
3 2.70 3.00 3,51 3.74 3.98 4.21
1 — — 3.80 4.10 4,40 4.70
2 2 - - 3.85 4.12 4.38 4.65
3 3.10,
*
3.30
3,40 3.91 4.14 4.14 4.61
1 - - 4.13 4,44 4.74 5.04
3 2 - - 4.19 4.45 4.72 4.98
3 3.63 3.83 4,24 . 3.47 4.71 4.94
Assumptions:
Case 1
Loan rate = $3.00
Interest on loan = 11.5 percent for first year
Discpunt rate « 13 percent per year
Storage loss = 3 percent per year
Storage cost = Storage payment = 26.5 cents/bushel/year
Case 2
Storage cost =11,5 cents/bushel/year
Other variables as in Case 1
Case 3
*Loan rate = $3,30
Interest on loan = zero
Storage cost = 11.5 cents/bushel/year
Other variables as in Case 1
a/~ The empty cells reflect the fact that wheat cannot be redeemed at prices
below the release level until the contract expires.
